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Abstract 
Learning about actions requires children to identify the boundaries of an action and its 
units. Whereas some action units are easily identified, parents can support children’s action 
learning by adjusting the presentation and using social signals. However, currently little is 
understood regarding how children use these signals to learn actions. 
In the current study we investigate the possibility that communicative signals are a 
particularly suitable cue for segmenting events. We investigated this hypothesis by presenting 18-
month-old children (N=60) with short action sequences consisting of toy animals either hopping 
or sliding across a board into a house, but interrupting this two-step sequence either (a) using an 
ostensive signal as a segmentation cue, (b) using a non-ostensive segmentation cue, and (c) 
without additional segmentation information between the actions. 
Marking the boundary using communicative signals increased children’s imitation of the 
less salient sliding action. Imitation of the hopping action remained unaffected. Crucially, 
marking the boundary of both actions using a non-communicative control condition did not 
increase imitation of either action. Communicative signals might be particularly suitable in 
segmenting non-salient actions that would otherwise be perceived as part of another action or as 
non-intentional. These results provide evidence of the importance of ostensive signals at event 
boundaries in scaffolding children’s learning. 
Keywords: Action Segmentation, Communicative Signals, Ostensive Communication, 
Action Imitation 
Word count: 6948 
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Research highlights: 
• We investigate the role of direct gaze and infant directed speech in segmenting action 
sequences in 18-month-old children. 
• Children are more likely to imitate parts of an action sequence if the boundaries of its units 
are marked by a short burst of gaze and infant-directed-speech, compared to a non-ostensive 
signal of the agent pausing and saying ‘hmm,’ or no boundary marking. 
• The increase in imitation is only seen for the non-salient action type; the salient action type 
shows high levels of imitation irrespective of the boundary marking condition. 
• Ostensive signals act as communicative signals of temporal reference, delineating the 
different units of an action sequence for toddlers. 
Introduction 
Children are avid social learners. From the age of 9 months they anticipate the goals of 
other social agents (Biro, 2013; Gredebäck et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2009) and start intentionally 
imitating other people’s actions during their second postnatal year (Jones, 2007, 2009). 
Caregivers support children’s learning of novel information using a wide range of behavioural 
adaptations and social signals. So far, parents’ modifications of child directed actions have been 
studied without direct reference to how these adaptations may contribute to the segmentation of 
action sequences. There are a number of recent findings, however, that suggest that 
communicative signals may also contribute to the segmentation of event sequences, and may be 
particularly important for children’s action learning. In the present study, we tested whether 18-
month-old children can use a brief exposure to a communicative signal to segment an action 
sequence and subsequently adjust which parts of the action sequence they imitate. 
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Children’s action imitation is selective 
Actions are intentional, goal-directed movements. These features distinguish them from 
incidental movements and events. Already from an early age, infants show an understanding of 
actions as goal-directed (Biro et al., 2014; Csibra, 2003; Verschoor et al., 2013) and distinguish 
between actions that are carried out in an efficient and non-efficient manner in relation to the 
action goal (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). Children do not blindly 
imitate all actions exactly the way they are shown (cf. Csibra, 2008), but selectively imitate the 
parts of the action (Carpenter et al., 1998; Király et al., 2013). For example, they will imitate a 
model turning on a lamp with their head, but only if there is no other rational explanation for this 
inefficient action manner (e.g. the model’s hands were occupied Gergely et al., 2002; Király et 
al., 2013). 
Children’s selective imitation is also evident in studies by Carpenter et al. (2005) and 
Southgate et al. (2009): Here, children were presented with a toy animal hopping or sliding into a 
toy house. When the hopping and sliding motions were presented on their own, children chose to 
imitate these actions to a high degree. However, children were less likely to imitate the manner of 
the action when it was presented together with a clear goal, e.g. putting the animal in the house, 
even though children were still more likely to imitate the hopping than sliding (Carpenter et al., 
2005). Furthermore, children who were told about the goal of the action, were more likely to 
imitate the action’s manner, compared to children who observed manner and outcome of the 
action, or discovered the outcome on their own (Southgate et al., 2009). Data from younger 
children indicates that 6-month-old infants are less likely to notice changes in the transition 
between different outcomes, compared to a change of the target locations. For example, they are 
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less likely to notice when a self-propelled ball bounces down before reaching its goal location 
after seeing it go on a straight line during habituation, compared to a change from one target goal 
location to another (Hespos et al., 2009). Therefore, children’s focus on the outcome of the action 
demonstrated in Carpenter et al. (2005) and Southgate et al. (2009) could be explained by 
perceptual failure of segmenting both actions and/or assigning intentionality to both parts of the 
action sequence. 
The structure of actions determines how actions are understood 
Like events, most actions can be described on different levels. They are hierarchically 
organised, with simpler action units nested in higher-order action plans (Elman, 1990; Zacks & 
Tversky, 2001). The action of making a cup of coffee, for example, may be described by said 
overarching goal (‘Making coffee’) or by the units that comprise the action, e.g. grinding the 
coffee, boiling the water, filling the coffee press with coffee, and subsequently water and pressing 
the coffee press down. These actions comprise the action sequence of the action ‘making coffee’, 
which in turn may be part of the overarching action sequence of ‘preparing breakfast’. As we can 
see, most actions consist of different action units with their own goals and sub goals. At the same 
time, they do not exist as isolated events, but are part of a wider action sequence (Zacks et al., 
2009). In the current paper, we will therefore refer to the highest relevant level of analysis of the 
description as the action, which comprises of action units. Therefore, observing actions (and 
potentially carrying out actions Hommel et al., 2001) shares many features with a general 
description of events, enriched by goals and intentions (Zacks et al., 2009). 
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According to Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks & Swallow, 2007) 
segmenting a stream of events plays an important role in the comprehension, anticipation and 
subsequent imitation of event sequences (Baldwin et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2001, 2007, 2009). 
The identification and segmentation of event boundaries is just as important as the identification 
of objects in space. Events can be segmented based on low-level features, such as motion cues, or 
prior, higher-order knowledge of the event (Zacks & Swallow, 2007). Adults are able to segment 
actions into finer or coarser units when requested (Zacks, 2004; Zacks et al., 2009). Already 10- 
to 11-month-old infants demonstrate sensitivity to event structures, looking longer at actions 
paused mid-stream, compared to those where the pause coincided with an event boundary 
(Baldwin et al., 2001). It is likely that visual features of the action stream are important 
contributors in identifying potential goals. 
Understanding actions as hierarchical structures has important implications for children’s 
imitation of actions as well: As we have seen in the study by Carpenter et al. (2005), children 
ignore parts of an action sequence when focusing on another part, even though they are capable 
of imitating the sequence on its own when no overarching goal is present. From an event 
segmentation perspective, the children who ignored the action manner potentially did not 
segment both actions, but saw the manner as only instrumental in getting the animal into the 
house. Interestingly, although imitation of both manner actions was reduced when the goal of 
putting the animal into the house was present, overall fewer children imitated the sliding 
compared to the hopping action. This might be because the hopping action can be more readily 
identified as an action on its own, as it is more repetitive, has a larger movement range and the 
additional effort and energy expenditure suggests that it marks it as an intentional action. The 
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children in the study by Southgate et al. (2009) on the other hand did not ignore the manner of the 
action if they were made aware of the outcome of the action ostensively prior to the action 
demonstration. Knowing the outcome of the action before might have helped children to perceive 
the action as its own event. Using this information, children are then able to recognise the manner 
as a separate event, in the same way that recognising familiar words within a stream of syllables 
allows for the recognition of new candidate words. 
Caregivers modify and adapt actions in teaching contexts and play 
Caregivers adapt and adjust how they present actions to children to make them more 
accessible for learning. Infant-directed actions are often presented in an exaggerated manner 
(Brand et al., 2002; Koterba & Iverson, 2009; Rutherford & Przednowek, 2012; Schaik et al., 
2020; Williamson & Brand, 2014), are highly repetitive (Brand et al., 2009) and caregivers 
interrupt and emphasise the boundaries of action units (Williamson & Brand, 2014). This balance 
between variation and repetition may be particularly suitable for learning and retaining attention 
(Brand et al., 2009; Goldstein et al., 2010; Twomey et al., 2017; Twomey & Westermann, 2017) 
and increases the capacity to learn from socially presented actions, compared to actions that 
children only observe incidentally. 
In addition, caregivers also use other social signals to ease and support infant learning. 
According to Natural Pedagogy Theory (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011) children have an innate 
sensitivity to some social signals that inform them of the presence of a communicative 
interaction. Natural Pedagogy builds upon dual intentions of communication — the intention to 
communicate, and the intention transmitting the content of the message (c.f. Sperber & Wilson, 
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1995; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Although young infants are unlikely to already possess the meta-
cognitive skills to interpret these informative intentions, Csibra (2010) suggests that infants have 
an early sensitivity towards direct gaze, infant-directed speech and contingent interactions that 
signal caregivers’ communicative intention. When addressed with these ostensive signals, 
children expect that caregivers will provide them with generalisable information (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). This very simple code-based system allows 
children to rapidly learn and acquire culturally-relevant knowledge (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 
2011). Their use is not just restricted to explicit teaching contexts, but also free play (Sage & 
Baldwin, 2012). 
Caregivers also use a second type of communicative signals, referential signals, to link the 
content of an interaction to the world around them. For example, through the use of pointing and 
gaze following, caregivers can restrict the number of possible referents (Senju et al., 2008; 
Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). Children start to follow pointing and gaze during their first year 
of life and (Morissette et al., 1995; Senju & Csibra, 2008) and identify the targets of pointing 
between 15-18 months (Morissette et al., 1995). These signals fulfill an important role of 
providing spatial reference and thereby restrict the number of possible referents in space (cf. 
Clark, 2003). 
Learning about actions also requires temporal information to identify potential candidate 
units for predicting and imitating an action sequence. Currently, there is no research into whether 
a similar referential signal exists in the temporal domain. Such a marker may be particularly 
important in segmenting events and action units that cannot reliably be identified through 
observation and therefore may be particularly important for event learning in general, and action 
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learning in particular. A temporal marker to denote the beginnings and ends of actions and their 
units may be just as important for learning about actions in the same way that protodeclarative 
pointing enables the disambiguation of different objects. 
Especially when the boundaries of events and actions cannot be reliably identified through 
observation, caregivers’ use of signals or cues that help to segment individual action units could 
potentially support children’s learning of these actions. Indeed, previous research has found that 
parents are more likely to look toward and address children at action boundaries (Brand et al., 
2007, 2013; Williamson & Brand, 2014). Children are also more likely to imitate an action if a 
model looks at them during event boundaries (Williamson & Brand, 2014) and parents reduce the 
amount of direct gaze at action boundaries with increasing age (and presumably prior knowledge) 
of their child (Brand et al., 2007). 
Many of these signals used by parents at event boundaries also signal the presence of 
communication, such as direct gaze and infant-directed speech. Direct gaze may be a particularly 
suitable signal to segment events and actions. Newborn infants already prefer looking at eyes 
with the contrast polarity of the human pupil/sclera, but not the inverse contrast polarity (Farroni 
et al., 2005). Faces and gaze also play an important role during early development, as during 
early infancy, faces are dominant stimuli (Fausey et al., 2016). This sensitivity and high 
frequency of exposure might help children to pay attention to faces as signifiers of interactions 
that are directed towards them. In adults, brief periods of direct gaze interrupts working memory 
and delays response times in a visual search task. Direct gaze also provides the listener with 
feedback during dialogue (e.g. Bavelas et al., 2002; Hömke et al., 2017). Furthermore, direct gaze 
is common even in cultures considered to be gaze-avoidant (Haensel et al., 2021). Because of its 
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privileged role and potentially disruptive properties, adults’ use of direct gaze and infant-directed 
speech at action boundaries may help children to break up and identify individual parts of an 
incoming stream of actions. Therefore, children might not only use ostensive signals to infer the 
presence of communication, but also segment an incoming event or action sequence. In the 
following study we investigate whether children use a social signal that is traditionally seen as an 
ostensive signal to segment an action stream by directly comparing the effect of a social marker, 
a non-social marker and a baseline condition without a boundary marker in segmenting a short 
action sequence. 
We investigated this question by adapting the paradigm used by Carpenter et al. (2005) 
and Southgate et al. (2009). Their finding, that children frequently imitate the outcome of the 
action but are much less likely to imitate its manner, could be interpreted as a failure to segment 
both action units. Instead, children perceive the action sequence of hopping or sliding into the 
house as part of a single action unit and consequently focus only on the outcome. If that was 
indeed the case, children’s imitation of the action’s manner might increase if the action sequence 
of hopping/sliding the animal into the house is interrupted between both action units, for example 
by addressing the children using direct gaze and infant-directed speech. This raises the interesting 
question of whether certain signals, such as communicative signals, are particularly suitable to 
segment such an event sequence, or whether any interruption of the action sequence is sufficient 
to mark both action units as separate units and subsequently increase the imitation of the action’s 
manner. We investigated this question in a between-subjects experiment by presenting three 
groups of 18-month-old toddlers the same action sequences in three different conditions. 
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The Baseline condition was comparable to the mouse-hopping/sliding-into-a-house 
sequence used by Carpenter et al. (2005) and the no-prior-information condition reported in the 
study by Southgate et al. (2009). Like Southgate et al. (2009), we used only one house rather than 
two houses like in Carpenter et al. (2005). Additionally, we added a communicative signal (a 
short exclamation of “Wow” combined with direct gaze) after the entire hopping/sliding-into-the-
house sequence was completed, to ensure that the same amount of ostensive signals are used 
compared to the communicative condition. 
In the Communicative condition, exactly the same linguistic and communicative signals 
were used. However, the short communicative signal was now presented after the 
hopping/sliding action and before putting the animal into the house. If social signals aid 
children’s action segmentation, establishing direct gaze and addressing the child with infant-
directed speech at the boundary between the hopping/sliding event and putting the animal into the 
house should help them interpret both action units as separate units worthy of imitation. We 
predicted that, if segmented in such way, imitation of the manner should increase for both types 
of action, because children now perceive both actions as distinct action events. 
Not all kinds of interruptions may, however, lead to the successful segmentation and 
subsequent imitation of the manner action unit. In the Control condition, we investigated whether 
a non-communicative signal—the actor paused, looked down and said ‘Hmmm’—would also 
affect children’s manner imitation. Therefore, the condition is identical to the Communicative 
condition, except for the signal used to mark the boundary between both action units. If the 
results mirror the baseline condition, we can infer that children do not use any interruption to 
segment the action sequence. If the results mirror the communicative condition, we can infer that 
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children also use non-communicative signals to segment action sequences. This would suggest 
that children use such interruptions to segment and learn about actions and whether 
communicative signals are more suitable than other, non-communicative, interruptions. 
Finally, because imitation of the putting-the-animal-into-the-house action was already 
high in previous studies, we do not expect that children’s imitation of the action outcome will be 
affected by additional segmentation information. 
Methods 
The methodology, hypotheses and analyses were preregistered on aspredicted.org, 
reference number #5771 for the baseline and marked-communicative conditions and #19880 for 
the marked-control condition. To account for missing data on the subject level, we deviated from 
the original hypothesis #5771 by using a Generalised Linear Models with item and subject 
random effects instead of ANOVAs. 
Participants 
The final sample contained 60 18-month-old toddlers (Mean: 18m, Min: 17.5m, Max: 
18.5m, 28 female), with 20 children in each condition. An additional 11 toddlers were tested, but 
excluded due to being unwilling to engage with the game (8), parental or sibling interference 
during all trials (2), incorrect age at time of testing (1). Eight of these children were in the 
communicative condition, 2 in the baseline condition and 1 in the non-communicative control 
condition. Written informed consent was provided by the caregivers and procedures were in 
accordance with institutional protocols. 
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Materials 
The actions were presented on a green cardboard mat (42 × 60 cm) with a small 
cardboard house (yellow, red). Four small toy animals (fox, rabbit, hedgehog, squirrel, all 
approximately 6–8 cm tall) were used to act out the actions. The animals were kept in a small, 
colourful box prior to the experiment. Additionally, we used a wooden stacking game during the 
warm-up phase. 
Procedure 
Toddlers were sitting on their caregiver’s lap. After a warm-up session to familiarise the 
toddlers with the room and the experimenter, the experimenter presented each animal to the 
toddler with a short statement (e.g. “The squirrel has a bushy tail”). The toddler was allowed to 
play with all animals for approximately one minute. Afterwards, the animals were returned to the 
box and the experimenter revealed the board with the house. The modelling phase began during 
which the experimenter took out one animal, placed it on the board and said: “Look what the 
[animal] does!” (German original: “Schau mal, was das [Tier] macht!”). He then moved the 
animal across the table with either the sliding or the hopping action. 
In the marked-communicatively condition, the experimenter looked up to the toddler and 
said “Wow” after the hopping/sliding movement, but before putting the animal into the house. In 
the baseline condition, the adult put the animal into the house before looking towards and 
addressing the child. 
In the marked-control condition, the experimenter looked down, put his hand to the chin 
and said “Hmmmm.” after the hopping/sliding movement, but before putting the animal into the 
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house. 
In the baseline condition, the experimenter did not pause between the hopping/sliding and putting 
animal into the house, but said “Wow” after putting the animal into the house to ensure the type 
and amount of verbal information remained the same when contrasted with the other conditions. 
After the animal was put into the house, the experimenter said “Great, the animal went 
into the house. Now it’s your turn!” (German original: “Toll, das Tier ist ins Haus gegangen. Jetzt 
bist du dran!”) before pushing the board to the child. Each trial demonstration lasted 
approximately 10 seconds, and the child had 30 seconds to respond. If the child did not engage 
with the animal, the experimenter encouraged the child by saying “Now you can play with it!” 
(“Jetzt kannst du damit spielen”), “Now it’s your turn” (“Jetzt bist du dran”) or similar. If the 
child attempted to pull the house off the board, the experimenter said: “That’s attached” (“Das ist 
fest.”). A visual illustration of the procedure is shown in Figure 1. 
fig1here 
 
Each child was presented with up to four trials of the actions. The actions were shown in a 
fixed order of sliding–hopping–hopping–sliding, (as recommended by Southgate et al., 2009). 
Boundary-marking was presented as a between-subjects factor: one third of the children saw the 
action in the boundary-marked communicatively condition, one third in the boundary-marked 
communicatively condition, and one third in the boundary unmarked control condition. 
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Coding 
Infants were scored on whether they (1) imitated the action manner (2) imitated the 
goal/outcome of the action. In line with previous research (Carpenter et al., 2005; Southgate et 
al., 2009), the action manner was coded as sliding when the animal moved continuously without 
breaking contact with the mat. The child imitated the hopping action, when the animal broke 
contact and made contact at least once again with the mat. For the analysis, only the previously 
modelled behaviour was coded as 1, any other non-modelled behaviour (e.g. hopping during a 
sliding trial) was coded as 0. The goal of putting the animal into the house was achieved if the 
child put the animal into the house at least once, even if the child removed the animal afterwards. 
Children were included in the analysis if they contributed at least any 2 out of the 4 trials. 
After coding, a total of 220 trials were included in the analysis (111 hopping, 109 sliding). An 
additional 20 trials (9 hopping, 11 sliding) were excluded from the analysis due to the child 
refusing to touch the animal or being fussy (11), parental interference (7) and experimenter error 
(2). 
A second coder naïve to the hypothesis coded manner and outcome in the videos of 39 
children. The interrater agreement was excellent for both manner 𝜅𝜅 = 0.90,𝑝𝑝 < .0001 and 
outcome 𝜅𝜅 = 0.94,𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. 
Data analysis 
Because some trials were missing, we decided to compute a Generalised Linear Mixed 
Effects model based on the binomial distribution using R [Version 4.0.3; R Core Team (2019)]. 
Preprocessing was conducted using the tidyverse (Wickham et al., 2019) packages and statistical 
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models were built in lme4 (Bates et al., 2015). Based on our pre-registration, we compared a 
model with Boundary Marker (factor levels: baseline, marked-communicative, marked-control) 
to a null model containing the intercept only. In an exploratory analysis, we also tested the 
interaction between Action Type (hopping/sliding) and Boundary Marking. We attempted to use 
the maximally converging random effects structure in line with recommendations by Barr et al. 
(2013). However, all models that were more complex than a single intercept with participant 
number at random effect level failed to converge due to singularity or the optimizer failing to 
establish a reliable solution to the model.  
Results 
fig2here 
Manner imitation: For the manner imitation in the Baseline condition, 18/36 children 
imitated the hopping, and 5/39 the sliding action. In the Marked-Communicative condition, 16/38 
imitated the hopping, and 14/35 the sliding action. In the Marked-Control condition, 11/37 
imitated the hopping, and 8/35 the sliding action. 
We are primarily interested in whether children were more likely to imitate the first action 
step if the boundary between the two action steps was marked either communicatively or non-
communicatively. Overall, the model containing only the boundary marker conditions did not 
perform better than the null model containing the intercept-only null model (𝜒𝜒2(3.50) = 2.00, 
𝑝𝑝 = .174). However, the model containing the interaction between boundary marker and action 
type performed significantly better than the marker-only model (𝜒𝜒2(13.70) = 3.00, 𝑝𝑝 = .003) 
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and the intercept only model (𝜒𝜒2(17.19) = 5.00, 𝑝𝑝 = .004). A detailed overview of the full 
comparison can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: 
Model comparison between baseline, marked-communicative and marked-control condition for 
the first part of the action sequence, the manner of putting the animal into the house. 
 
Par AIC BIC logLik 
devianc
e Chisq Df 
Pr(>C
hisq) 
Null Model 2 281.577 288.364 -138.788 277.577    
Marker Model 4 282.082 295.656 -137.041 274.082 3.495 2 0.174 
Marker x Action Type 
Interaction 7 274.385 298.140 -130.192 260.385 
13.69
7 3 0.003 
To investigate the effect of the boundary marking on children’s imitation of the action 
manner, we first compared the manner imitation in the experimental groups to the baseline 
condition. To disentangle the interaction effect, we investigated these differences on the subsets 
of the hopping/sliding action factor separately. Our results show that the sliding action was 
imitated by only few children at baseline (M = 12%, 95% CI[5%, 27%]). Here, the marked-
communicative condition shows a statistically significant increase in imitation (M = 39%, 95% 
CI[24%, 58%], 𝛽𝛽 = 1.57, p = .015), but this effect could not be found in the marked-control 
condition (M = 21%, 95% CI[10%, 39%], 𝛽𝛽 = 0.72, p = .271). The hopping action was imitated 
by half the children at baseline level (M = 50%, 95% CI[33%, 67%]). Marking the boundary 
communicatively (M =42%, 95% CI[26%, 59%]) or with the control intervention (M = 29%, 
95% CI[16%, 46%]) did not significantly affect their imitation (Baseline – Marked-
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communicative: 𝛽𝛽 = -0.38, p = .524, Baseline – Marked-control: 𝛽𝛽 = -1.05, p = .103). A visual 
representation of these results can be found in Figure 2 A. 
We investigated the effect of communication against the other two conditions by 
investigating the subsets of the hopping and sliding data. We found that children imitate the 
sliding manner significantly more (𝛽𝛽 = 1.20, p = .022) than in the other two conditions, but 
marking actions in the communicative condition did not have the same effect for the hopping 
action (𝛽𝛽 = 0.13, p = .797). 
Finally, we analysed the difference between the hopping/sliding action for each of the 
condition levels separately. In line with previous studies using this paradigm (Carpenter et al., 
2005) we found a difference in the imitation of the hopping and sliding action in the baseline 
condition, i.e. the condition that replicates the original study most closely (𝛽𝛽 = -2.01, p = .002). 
This difference was neither apparent in the marked-communicative (𝛽𝛽 = -0.10, p = .843), nor the 
marked-control condition (𝛽𝛽 = -0.41, p = .473). 
Outcome imitation: For the outcome imitation in the Baseline condition, 33/36 children 
put the animal into the house after the hopping, and 34/39 after the sliding action. In the Marked-
Communicative condition, 36/38 imitated the outcome action after hopping, and 32/35 after 
sliding action. In the Marked-Control condition, 34/37 imitated the outcome after the hopping, 
and 31/35 the sliding action. 
The analysis using a mixed effects model with the same specifications as in the manner 
analysis suggested that the null model explains the data best. Imitation of the action outcome was 
very high across all conditions and 90.91% of the children imitated the outcome (see Figure 2 B). 
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Adding additional factors to account for boundary marker (𝜒𝜒2(0.09) = 2.00, 𝑝𝑝 = .957) and the 
interaction between boundary marker and prior manner demonstration (𝜒𝜒2(1.98) = 5.00, 𝑝𝑝 =
.852) did not lead to a significantly better model. 
Combined analysis of manner and outcome depending on condition: We investigated the 
imitation of manner and outcome in the same model to compare the effects of the experimental 
conditions for both segments of the action sequence. In the first step, we compared a model 
containing the interaction between Condition (Baseline, Communicative, Control) and the action 
segment (Manner, Outcome) with a null model. Due to a failure of convergence at the null model, 
we compared both models with trial number as the only random effect. The model containing the 
interaction between Condition and Segment was significantly better than the null model (𝜒𝜒2 (5) = 
178.97, p < .001). Within the full model, the only significant effect was that of Segment, with 
Outcome segments being significantly more likely to be imitated than Manner segments at 
baseline (𝛽𝛽 = 3.13, SE = 0.48, t = 6.49, p < .001). All other p values are p > 0.20. These results 
are also visualised by Figure 2 A and B. 
Discussion 
We were interested in the role of communicative and non-communicative signals in 
segmenting action sequences during child-directed action presentations. Our results showed that 
separating a short action sequence by briefly interrupting the action steps using child-directed 
speech and direct gaze increased children’s imitation of the less salient sliding action. For the 
more salient hopping action, marking the boundary between the action manner and the outcome 
did not increase the level of imitation that was already high in the unmarked condition. Despite 
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this, we do not find such an effect for the non-communicatively marked control condition. These 
results provide support for the hypothesis that communicative signals help children segment 
action sequences, but these effects are only observable in less salient actions. 
Our results suggest that any effect of communicative signals at event boundary markers 
only generalises to the sliding action in our study. In contrast, the hopping action remained 
unaffected, and was copied at a comparatively high level independently of condition. It is 
possible that the hopping action used in our study is more readily identified as an action unit due 
to its salience. Previous research has already highlighted the role of salience in children’s 
imitation of actions. For example, toddlers between 12–30 months were more likely to imitate a 
hammering action compared to a less salient pulling action (Gampe et al., 2016) and 12-month-
olds were better at learning to anticipate reaches towards large, compared to small objects (Adam 
et al., 2016; Henrichs et al., 2012). Therefore, the contribution of communicative signals to goal-
directed action segmentation might be to identify action boundaries particularly in low salience 
actions. 
As in previous studies (Carpenter et al., 2005; Southgate et al., 2009), children imitated 
the outcome to a very high degree and our manipulation did not affect whether children put the 
animal into the house. Previous studies attributed this difference to the importance of distinct 
goals versus the manner of the action (Bekkering et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2005). As previous 
studies by Hespos and colleagues (Hespos et al., 2009, 2010) have shown, children find it easier 
to recognise event with clear distinctive outcomes, rather than transitions between events. 
These results are compatible with theories emphasising the segmentation and chunking of 
incoming information, such as Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks & 
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Swallow, 2007) and domain-general theories of chunking and bottlenecks (Christiansen & 
Chater, 2016; Isbilen et al., 2020). Event Segmentation Theory also suggests that bottom-up and 
top-down processes influence the perception of an incoming stream of events (Zacks & Swallow, 
2007), such as the action sequence observed by the children in our study. According to Event 
Segmentation Theory, the way that an event is segmented affects how it is interpreted. 
Consequently, the segmentation of an action should lead to a different interpretation of the action 
sequence. Whereas the uninterrupted action sequence is interpreted as “putting the animal into 
the house” (by any means), the interrupted event sequence is interpreted as two separate events of 
“sliding” and “putting the animal into the house.” Crucially, because the hopping action is more 
readily recognised, more salient, more repetitive and potentially has clearer event boundaries, the 
hopping action may have already provided sufficient information to be recognised as its own 
separate action sequence, and additional segmentation cues were not helpful. 
To explain why the communicative interruption increased the imitation of the sliding 
action when the non-communicative interruption did not, it is possible to appeal to low-level 
perceptual features of direct gaze and infant-directed speech or higher order inferences about the 
communicative intent of the interruption. Communicative signals have many properties that make 
them particularly suitable for signalling event boundaries. For example, infants show a stimuli-
specific preference towards gaze (Farroni et al., 2000, 2002; Michel, Wronski, et al., 2017; 
Michel, Pauen, et al., 2017) and infant-directed speech (Dominey & Dodane, 2004), and direct 
gaze appears to interrupt working memory in adults (Wang & Apperly, 2016). However, so far 
we do not know why these specific properties of direct gaze and child-directed-speech make 
them suitable for action and event segmentation. In fact, other, non-social signals may have 
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similar effects on action segmentation and increase the imitation of action manner in this 
paradigm as long as the boundary-marking event is clearly identifiable as an intentional action. 
For instance, it is possible that a non-social, but clearly intentional ‘beep’ initiated by a button 
press may have had a similar effect on action segmentation, comparable to the way that children 
flexibly use an adult’s intentional placement of an item as a referential signal to identify the 
location of a hidden reward (Moore et al., 2013, 2015). If this is the case, even a simple pause 
might be sufficient to induce the segmentation of an action, if marked as intentional. For 
example, 6- (Sharon & Wynn, 1998) and 10– to 11-month old (Baldwin et al., 2001) infants that 
have been familiarised with video sequences of everyday actions look longer if the video 
sequence is paused within an intentional action, compared to a pause between intentional actions. 
Therefore, the effect might not be specific to social signals and any pause may be sufficient to 
segment non-salient actions for children and subsequently increase their imitation. 
On the other hand, children may have interpreted the boundary marker in the control 
condition differently to the communicative interruption, due to differences in the valence and 
expressed intention. For example, children might have interpreted the non-communicative control 
marker to indicate hesitation. In other studies, children of a similar age were sensitive to such 
information and imitated the intended goals of failed actions, instead of faithfully copying 
accidental actions (Carpenter et al., 1998). Therefore, they may have interpreted the part of the 
action preceding the “Hmmm” as accidental and non-intentional, and were therefore less inclined 
to imitate it. Similarly, the interruption used in the communicative and control conditions also 
differed in terms of valence of the interruption itself, and children may have perceived the 
“Hmmm” as showing less positive affect towards the previously executed action and this may 
25 
SOCIAL SIGNALS SEGMENT ACTIONS IN TODDLERS  
have lead to the—albeit not significant—decrease in imitated behaviour even for the hopping 
action. However, in the baseline condition and the communicative condition, identical linguistic 
information was used, and the enthusiastic “Wow!” was used in both the baseline and the 
communicative condition, albeit at different temporal locations. Therefore, any difference 
observed between these conditions would be due to the position of the cue, rather than the 
amount and direction of emotional valence expressed by the model in the interaction. 
The communicative interruption of the action sequence in our study does not support the 
interpretation of direct gaze and social signals as markers of ostension in this particular context. 
According to empirical evidence, in young infants below 6 months of age, communicative signals 
function like a ‘switch’ (Csibra, 2010) for learning, that is either on or off, instead of providing a 
gradual response towards different levels of “communicative-ness” (Parise & Csibra, 2013). This 
function of communicative signals cannot explain the results, because (1) in our study, the entire 
action sequence was sandwiched between the experimenter speaking to the child using 
communicative signals at the beginning and the end of each trial. (2) The amount of 
communicative signals remained the same, and only the temporal location of one of them was 
varied. (3) Communicative signals typically precede relevant information, but in our study they 
followed the part of the action sequence that children were more likely to imitate. 
Given that the interaction between the child and the experimenter was already marked as a 
pedagogical interaction by the presence of communicative signals at the beginning of each trial, 
any additional communicative signals could only be used to further interpret the presented action 
sequence. Children might have been actively looking for an interpretation of the communicative 
interruption, and determined that the signal intends to communicate the importance of the 
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otherwise ignored manner of the action as a relevant sub-action. Therefore, children may have 
used the already established relevance of the action demonstration to interpret the position of the 
communicative marker. 
Previous studies on the effect of communicative signals as indicators of ostension have 
investigated the processing of objects (e.g. Michel, Wronski, et al. (2017); Yoon et al. (2008), but 
see Silverstein et al. (2019)), or relatively short and simple actions (Hernik & Csibra, 2015). But 
objects, unlike actions, are static. The temporal progression of an unfolding action sequence 
might benefit from regular bursts of communicative signals to retain focus and attention. If this is 
the case, the uninterrupted sliding action was potentially too long to sustain attention, and the 
communicative interruption provided a boost soon enough after the action segment had ended. 
Whether we appeal to a lower-level or a higher-level interpretation of the results, our 
results also point towards a novel function of communicative signals within action sequences. 
Interrupting an action sequence communicatively provides important information on interpreting 
the meaning of the event by providing temporal reference, in addition to spatial reference that 
can be established through referential gaze to object locations (Butler et al., 2000) or pointing 
(Gliga & Csibra, 2009; Melinder et al., 2014; Morissette et al., 1995). In just the same way that 
gaze and pointing can be used to indicate the location of an object in space, communicative 
signals can be used to signal event boundaries. Following lower-level accounts, such as cognitive 
chunking, the communicative interruption provided a possibility to store the manner of the action 
separately rather than chunk it together with the more salient goal and subsequently forget it 
(Christiansen & Chater, 2016). Appealing to higher-level inferential accounts, children actively 
search for the relevance of the communicative interruption, taking into account its position within 
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the action stream. However, as discussed before, they are not using the communicative 
interruption as a signal of ostension [which already exists in all conditions], but a marker of an 
event boundary. 
Conclusions 
Our study shows that communicative signals can help to increase the imitation of a non-
salient action unit in 18-month-old children. Importantly, our results also show that children do 
not use any interruption to segment these actions. In our study, the communicative marker, but 
not the non-communicative control marker, increased the imitation of the sliding action. These 
findings open up a new way of looking at the role of caregiver-child interactions by highlighting 
the role of structural information that guides pedagogical actions. 
The preceding discussion of our results has also shown the importance of further 
investigating how children use social and non-social signals to segment events. As the results of 
our experiment only show an effect of marker location on one of the two actions, future 
investigations need to systematically broaden the range of actions and control their salience to 
generalise the findings to other actions. 
In the current study we investigated the effect of communicative signals on the 
segmentation of a short action sequence. We have argued that this may be a crucial aspect of 
teaching novel actions to children. However, it is likely that these signals may also be useful in 
segmenting events in general, for example when teaching verbs. 
Additionally, by looking at the information provided by caregivers in action teaching 
contexts, we find many similarities with the segmentation and processing of linguistic 
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information (see Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Hilton et al., 2019). Processing of action steps 
may be incremental and lower levels of representation may be chunked together to form larger 
representations of actions and their meanings. Children as well as adults may use such an 
incremental, bottom-up approach to identify and segment basic action units and re-assemble them 
into larger chunks to facilitate prediction. By drawing on the structural information that is 
inherent in action-, event- and language processing, it may be possible to develop and enhance 
domain-general models of learning. 
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Supplementary Information 
 
Figure 3.   Total number of trials contributed by participants across trials and conditions. In total, 
111 trials were included for the hopping action and 109 trials for the sliding action. 
 
Figure 4.   Counts of imitated trials per trial number. If a child imitated the modelled action 
during a trial, their behaviour was coded as 1, if they did not imitate the behaviour, it was coded 
as 0. 
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Figure 5.   Overview of all behaviours for each trial number. In the analysis, an action was only 
coded as 1 if it was modelled by the experimenter during the trial. 
 
Figure 6.   Overview of all behaviours for each trial number across conditions. In the analysis, an 
action was only coded as 1 if it was modelled by the experimenter during the trial. 
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Figure 7.   Plot for children that imitated the inverse action, i.e. hopping during a sliding trial, 
sliding during a hopping trial (Label: TRUE; Label: FALSE indicates the number of trials where 
children either chose to imitate the target action or did not imitate at all). Trials 1 and 4 were 
sliding trials, trials 3 and 4 were hopping trials. 
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